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Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plans to use the ISO standard Common
Criteria (CC) as the tool for developing graded and measurable evaluation criteria for
information technology in safeguards systems in facilities subject to IAEA inspection.
This paper reviews the IAEA approach to use of the CC standard and makes comparisons
to the possible use of the CC standard by US agencies.
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11. Introduction
The information technology community has created a standard called the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation ("Common Criteria", or "CC")
[CC]. The CC is a catalog of criteria and a framework for organizing a subset of the
criteria into security specifications and evaluation specifications. The CC defines a set of
“Evaluation Assurance Levels” (EALs) that are a set of selected criteria for evaluation of
information technology security. The EAL concept can be extended to define levels of
authentication, and the associate procedures to reach these levels, with regard to a Target
of Evaluation (TOE). Evaluation has been the traditional means of gaining assurance, and
is the basis of the Common Criteria approach.
The IAEA plans to use the Common Criteria, as the tool for developing graded and
measurable evaluation criteria for information technology (IT) in safeguards systems in
facilities subject to IAEA inspection.  In their draft paper [ITSECSES] the IAEA defines
a three-tiered Vulnerability Assessment Level (VAL) scheme. Each increased VAL level
(1-3) defines additional and more stringent security and security-related requirements for
the system developer, the system evaluator (assessor or authenticator), and for the IAEA.
When all parties meet all requirements for a particular VAL level, the IAEA has a
measurable degree of confidence in the secure and proper operation of an IT system.
In [ITSECSES] the IAEA only addresses the security evaluation or assessment of IT and
does not specify security requirements per-se.  However, the paper does recommend the
development of CC Protection Profiles (information security requirements in CC
parlance) for specific purpose IT and for the use of previously evaluated products for
commonly available commercial off-the-shelf IT components (e.g., general-purpose
operating systems, database management systems, and firewalls).
Independent of the IAEA effort, the Russian Federation (RF) is taking steps to adopt the
Common Criteria as a Russian Standard and to enter the Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement [CCRA].  They are being aided in this effort through the United States
Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
(MPC&A) Program.  Successful completion of these actions will facilitate RF meeting its
information security requirements with respect to non-domestic IT used (increasingly) in
safeguards systems and elsewhere. Adoption of CC should also make it relatively easy
for the RF to step up to other CC-derived requirements, such as the IAEA plan we review
here.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and DOE also need to establish
confidence in the proper and secure functioning of IT systems in the states of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), especially in the Russian Federation.2  DTRA must authenticate
systems used to safeguard FSU weapon-origin nuclear material.  DOE has (possibly less
stringent) assurance requirements for IT systems used to safeguard FSU weapons-grade
nuclear material. The US has adopted the Common Criteria for information technology
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2security evaluation and is a signatory to [CCRA].  Given the RF intent to adopt the CC,
an approach similar to that in [ITSECSES] has potential to satisfy DTRA and DOE
authentication/assurance requirements.
32 Notes on RF IT Security Practices
In reviewing [ITSECSES] definition of the VALs with a view to implementing a similar
approach to evaluating/authenticating IT systems in the RF, certain issues need to be
raised. There are two well-entrenched concepts in RF approach to IT systems that make
proper application of the CC a challenge.  First, in their approach to security, in the RF a
security evaluation does not set out to manage risk, but to guarantee it has been
eliminated.  The North American and Western European information security community
has reached a strong consensus that one must deal with uncertainty and manage security
risks that cannot be completely eradicated.  Second, in the RF approach to the system
development and life cycle for IT, one does not plan to manage change (e.g., in
specifications or system design).  In the RF, when one accepts specifications, design, and
implementation one guarantees the perfection (now and into the future) of these levels of
abstraction of an IT system.  As a result there is a strong incentive for both developer and
customer to create lots of wiggle room in specifications, design documents, etc., so that
when the inevitable problems arise, the system (at any level of abstraction) can still be
said to meet all requirements.
The former issue has made translation of [CC] into the Russian language a very difficult
endeavor at times.  The issue of not sharing the same understanding of the management
of risk and uncertainty in IT security evaluation may seriously delay RF accession to the
CCRA – it is that important to the members of the CCRA (and membership requires
unanimous approval of all 14 members3).  Anyone discussing information security
evaluation issues with representatives of the RF needs to bear in mind these
fundamentally different approaches to IT between our cultures.
The latter issue occasionally makes contracting for the development of IT in the FSU a
challenge for North Americans and Western Europeans – it’s hard to pin them down. In
Section 2.4.2 [ITSECSES], the IAEA cites ISO standards for Life Cycle Management as
good examples of standards with which they could agree.  These are standards that may
be difficult for the RF to step up to, much less adopt in the near future. That said, the
IAEA recommends an approach to life cycle management that may fit the RF situation
(Annex A.7.2 [ITSECSES]):
“The CC defines a standardized life cycle model as one approved by a
‘group of experts’.  Therefore, any life cycle model approved by the IAEA
can meet this requirement.  This approval can be gained through
contractual negotiations and/or could be a model accepted through other
standards bodies (e.g., CMM, ISO).”
Since to be effective this approach requires agreeing to a specific life cycle plan, those
who need to define the maintenance of assurance (authentication) throughout the life
cycle of IT must plan to put considerable effort into negotiating this bit.  DTRA and DOE
might do well to promote either adoption by RF of a recognized life cycle management
standard or to negotiate this issue on a global basis for their Programs.
                                                
3 Members of the CCRA include: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.
4On a positive note, the information security elements of the Ministry of Atomic Energy
of the Russian Federation are indicating interest in certifying a family of open source
GNU/Linux operating systems.  This could provide RF a foundation on which they could
develop everything from embedded systems for measurement instruments and physical
protection equipment to large (e.g., multi-CPU, multi-tier servers) management system
applications.  With source code available they can:
•  Modify GNU/Linux to meet RF’s stringent information security
requirements.
•  Meet typical assurance levels expected of general purpose operating
systems as may be required by the IAEA, DTRA, DOE, and others.
•  Meet strong assurance levels for a small critical equipment by minimizing
the features of an embedded GNU/Linux operating system.
53 Authentication Variation Between the IAEA and the U.S. Government
The IAEA goal with inspection and monitoring activities is to verify that nuclear material
under agreement is as declared and that it remains in place.  IAEA monitoring employs
on-site inspections, on-site monitoring, and remote monitoring.  On site material is
randomly sampled for the IAEA to conduct non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements
and accounting records and procedures are reviewed.  Remote monitoring via video
surveillance cameras utilizing a combination of motion video and still images reduces the
cost of monitoring.  Images and video may be shipped to the IAEA or reviewed on site
during monitoring visits.  The IAEA supplies evaluated equipment for NDA testing and
video surveillance.  The IAEA conducts (through qualified contractors) evaluation of
equipment (it’s trusted). The IAEA has strong control of the NDA equipment they use
on-site.  The IAEA’s main problem with respect to the on-site equipment is to protect the
integrity of their evaluated equipment.  The IAEA is concerned the monitored facility
may be able to spoof their trusted equipment.
Although the goal of inspection and monitoring activities is highly similar, there are key
differences between DTRA’s compliance monitoring scheme at the Fissile Material
Storage Facility and the IAEA approach briefly discussed above. These are mostly driven
by national security concerns of the Russian Federation.  DTRA monitors will not operate
the NDA equipment.  The host country (Russia) will supply the monitoring equipment.
The host country will operate the monitoring equipment.  The host country will conduct
security evaluations of the monitoring equipment, after which DTRA representatives will
no longer be allowed to touch the equipment.  DTRA will have relatively strong control
of the Inventory Sampling Measurement System, but this is much less so for the other
monitoring equipment at the Fissile Material Storage Facility.  It is likely that review of
video surveillance imagery will be available only on-site.  DTRA’s main problem with
respect to the on-site monitoring equipment is that the equipment cannot be trusted.
DTRA must continually attempt to re-authenticate the monitoring equipment without
touching it.  DTRA is concerned the monitoring equipment itself contains flaws that
prevent accurate measurements and monitoring.
64 Defines IAEA Assurance Requirements
The IAEA defines assurance requirements only.  The differences between security
functions and assurances are made clear in Section 3 [ITSECSES].  There is no mistaking
that this document does not specify security functions/requirements.  In Strategies to
Minimize Evaluation/Assessment Costs (Section 5 [ITSECSES]) the IAEA calls for the
separate Creation of IAEA Standard Protection Profiles (Section 5.3 [ITSECSES]).
It is clear the IAEA is in tune with the CC understanding of information security
assurance.  In Section 3.1.2 [ITSECSES] it is made clear that assurance is gained through
both technical and procedural means – a holistic view of IT systems. The necessity to
identify and manage risk is discussed. It is recognized that exorbitant cost may be
required to completely eliminate a risk and it may be necessary to modify the system to
minimize the impact of exposure to that risk.  Further it is advocated that for some risks
the system can be monitored to detect occurrences of compromise and that mitigation of
the detected compromise may be the appropriate cost-effective remedy.
The IAEA maps the life cycle for IT to their existing framework for the authorization of
Equipment Systems and Application Software for safeguards use and also to the CC
approach (Section 3.2 [ITSECSES]).  The mappings demonstrate there are no missing
elements for the IAEA in adopting the CC approach.
The CC deals with assessment issues and requests for clarifications from the developer
by defining Observation Reports (OR) in the companion document Common Evaluation
Methodology [CEM]. The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) is defined in [CEM] to
document the technical justification for the assessment verdict. OR and ETR reports can
be made to satisfy IAEA requirements for standardized documentation of assurance for
various equipments (Section 3.2 [ITSECSES].
75 Roles in the Context of Assurances
Five roles are defined [ITSECSES] in the context of assurances:
·  IAEA Oversight
·  Safeguards Equipment Developers
·  Vulnerability Assessors
·  Inspectors
·  Operational Users.
The first four of these are assigned responsibilities to implement specific assurance
criteria.  The operational users, on the one hand, are part of the environment and threat,
and on the other hand, their proper use of the equipment drives certain assurance criteria
(e.g., user interface clarity, simplicity, and consistency) and documentation criteria (e.g.,
user guide documentation quality).  Inspectors (IAEA personnel) have responsibilities to
monitor ongoing assurance indicators and perform maintenance of assurance
checks/procedures during periodic inspection visits.
These roles are reasonably consistent with DTRA and DOE practice with respect to IT
projects in the FSU.  However, there are minor differences in terminology and function.
DTRA would use Authentication Assessors in place of Vulnerability Assessors and
Monitors in place of  Inspectors.  Under the DOE MPC&A Program, formal information
security assurances are not required and less formal IT system acceptance criteria are
substituted.  DOE Project Managers accept contracted MPC&A IT systems on technical
requirements negotiated into each development contract.  The MPC&A program does not
include an ongoing oversight function, and thus there is no monitor role.
86 The IAEA Vulnerability Assessment Levels (VAL)
In [ITSECSES] the IAEA discusses CC concepts for assurance and describes the eight
CC assurance classes:
ACM Control over the configuration of the equipment
ADO Confidence the Equipment was the One Shipped and it is Installed
Correctly
ADV Confidence Through the Process of Development
AGD Documentation Delivered with the Equipment
ALC Assurance Gained Throughout the Product Life Cycle
ATE Testing
AVA Determination of System Vulnerabilities
AMA Maintenance of Assurance After Assessment
For each of these classes typical high-level requirements are called out for the roles
defined above (excepting the operational users).  These high-level requirements are not
the specific assurance criteria – these are defined in [ITSECSES] in Annex A (Safeguards
Equipment Developers), Annex B (Vulnerability Assessors), and Annex C (IAEA
Oversight and Inspectors (including technicians)).
The IAEA is in agreement with these CC classes, which are further broken down into
families (two to seven per class) of related requirements in the CC documentation, where
specific criteria are spelled out.  [CC3] provides some 208 pages of detailed individual
criteria in these classes and families.
The CC has seven predefined assurance packages, known as Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EALs).  These provide balanced groupings of assurance components that are
intended to be generally applicable.  The seven EALs are as follows:
·  EAL1 - functionally tested
·  EAL2 - structurally tested
·  EAL3 - methodically tested and checked
·  EAL4 - methodically designed, tested and reviewed
·  EAL5 - semi formally designed and tested
·  EAL6 - semi formally verified design and tested
·  EAL7 - formally verified design and tested
The IAEA elected not to use any of the predefined packages, but instead identified three
of their own, which they have identified as Vulnerability Assessment Levels (VALs). The
IAEA defined the packages they needed to provide a balance between a reasonable and
appropriate combination of threats to the equipment in the safeguards environment and
budgetary considerations. This custom package declaration is acceptable and expected
practice under the CC.
The VALs are assembled such that they roughly correspond to EAL3, EAL4, and EAL5
– but they are not identical to these.  The VALs increase in strength from VAL1 through
VAL3.  Their names provide good indicators of their intended applicability:
·  VAL1 Minimally Acceptable Assessment
9·  VAL2 State of the Art Assessment
·  VAL3 Critical Equipment Assessment
VAL1 “is meant to be used to assess the vulnerabilities of equipment supporting overall
safeguards operation but not containing safeguards critical information.  It is a statement
of the minimal assurance expected of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment.” This is a not
unreasonable position for the IAEA to take and this is borne out by reviewing the large
number of CC evaluated products that have met or are being targeted at EAL3 and EAL4.
Even if the IAEA would permit host built equipment, VAL1 would probably be difficult
to achieve by host country developers in some of the less well-developed countries under
IAEA safeguards inspection.
VAL2 “encapsulates the package of assurance measures that the IT market expects of
commercial-off-the-shelf equipment protecting sensitive information.  It is the preferred
assurance that any equipment used in nuclear safeguards should have.”  It is not
unreasonable for the IAEA to target this level as many completed and in process CC
evaluations are targeted at level EAL4.  Although commercial off-the-shelf components
already evaluated at EAL4 will not fully meet VAL2, there are positives here.  First, in
some cases the developer may be able to meet VAL2 with a minimum of effort starting
with an EAL4 component and layering additional security features.  Second, the
regularity with which EAL4 is being targeted is a strong indicator that good developer
practice can result in achieving VAL2 at reasonable cost.
VAL3 “encapsulates the level of assurance economically possible for equipment used in
nuclear safeguards.  It encapsulates the security processes and procedures shown to
provide substantial added assurance in the security features of equipment.”  With this
level, the IAEA calls out several criteria that are quite demanding of the developer.
Appropriately, they note that VAL3 is intended for small, critical, specialty equipment,
and they expect that in order for such equipment to meet VAL3 will add a relatively large
cost to equipment development.
10
7 Cost Containment
A number of practical measures are proposed to contain costs in an IAEA evaluated
products environment:
·  Use of Standard Assessment Processes
·  Early Integration of Security Requirements into Project Planning
·  Creation of IAEA Standard Protection Profile(s)
·  Early Input to Functional Design
·  Role of Pre-Evaluated Products.
All of these are sensible recommendation that we endorse. In ANNEX E [ITSECSES],
the IAEA recommends the use of industry standard information security profiles
wherever possible to specify the appropriate security functionality for safeguards
equipment.  They recommend defining specialized IAEA requirements for as few
components as possible.  This seems a wise strategy for managing both cost and
schedule.
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8 Selected Criteria
A summary of the selected criteria, newly defined criteria, and revised criteria, defined in
Annex A [ITSECSES] is presented in Table 1 below.
CC
class
Description Criteria
count
New Revised
ACM Control over the configuration of the
equipment 24 0 0
ADO Confidence the Equipment was the One
Shipped and it is Installed Correctly 6 1 0
ADV Confidence Through the Process of
Development 77 0 0
AGD Documentation Delivered with the
Equipment
26 1 11
ALC Assurance Gained Throughout the
Product Life Cycle 21 0 8
ATE Testing
25 0 5
AVA Determination of System Vulnerabilities
12 0 2
AMA Maintenance of Assurance After
Assessment 52 0 0
TOTALS 243 2 26
Table 1:  Selected Criteria
Analysis of the selected criteria indicates strong IAEA interest in customizing the
assurance classes for documentation (AGD) and life cycle (ALC), and moderate interest
in customizing the assurance classes for testing (ATE) and determination of system
vulnerabilities (AVA).  For documentation class AGD, many of the changes seem to be
driven by two IAEA concerns (inferred from analyzing the differences between the
revised and original criteria):
·  Documentation should be provided by role (administrator, user, etc).
·  Documentation should be organized in an IAEA standard manner.
These issues dominate the revisions in the documentation class.  This may well be an
important issue for the IAEA, but to the extent it inhibits re-use of CC certified
evaluations of general purpose components, it may not be a good direction for others to
take.
For the life cycle class (ALC), the revisions are acknowledged by the IAEA as minor, but
were made in an attempt to make these requirements more explicit and clearly
understandable to developers.  Given the IAEA emphasis on life cycle (especially during
12
equipment operational lifetime) this is understandable, but again to the extent it inhibits
re-use of CC certified evaluations of general purpose components, it may not be a good
direction for others to take.
The number of criteria specified for development class ADV is not remarkable.  This is
an important area and has the greatest number of families (subclasses) of criteria (seven)
of any CC class.  It is perhaps interesting that none of these are revised in [ITSECSES].
This may be more a case of the keen attention paid this class by the authors of the CC
than to any lack of interest by the IAEA.
Maintenance of assurance after assessment (AMA) is an interesting class in that the
authors of the CC have acknowledged their general dissatisfaction with what they have so
far produced.  Significant changes are planned for the next version of the CC due in draft
form in fall, 2001 and likely adoption in the second half of CY 2002. Maintenance of
assurance is a stated interest area for the IAEA and this interest is reflected in the number
of criteria selected.  Given the relative immaturity of these criteria in the CC, it seems
remarkable that the IAEA had no new criteria and no revisions in this class.  One
surmises the IAEA is aware of coming changes to the CC and is merely biding their time
in this area.  In other words, despite the number of criteria selected, this may be a
placeholder.
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9 Other Assurance Roles
9.1 Assessor (Authenticator) Assurance
The IAEA defines a reasonable set of “… requirements on assessors in the handling of
assessment information and the reporting requirements to the IAEA” (ANNEX B
[ITSECSES]).  This is an important addition since the IAEA intends to do their own
evaluations and may not be using testing laboratories certified under any country’s
National Scheme for CC evaluations.  This approach may well apply to DTRA and DOE
authentications and assurances for IT monitored in the FSU.  The criteria in this section
(ANNEX B) are all newly defined criteria. The criteria are based on an interpretation of
guidance and recommendations provided in [CEM2], a companion document to [CC] that
is not part of the ISO standard.
Criteria are defined to manage the assessor’s assessment reports and associated materials
and documentation.  Criteria are defined to assure safe and sound delivery of an IAEA
Vulnerability Assessment Technical Report (IAVATR).  Criteria are defined to govern
the preparation and content of the IAVATR, modeled after the CC Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR). It is made clear that the IAVATR is not a pass/fail determination, but a
detailed report of “… how well the equipment has stood up to the specific attack
scenarios provided as input to the assessment. In particular, the assessor must confirm
that the implementation of the functional requirements clearly meets the statements of
which threats have to be eliminated, minimized or monitored.”
Criteria are defined to assure the assessment test tools and methods are appropriate.
Finally, criteria are defined to assure the assessment testing is appropriate.  These last two
sets of criteria are partly an attempt to step up to the problem that the IAEA so far has no
certification program for assessors and assessment laboratories.
In Vulnerability Assessors (Section 3.3.3 [ITSECSES]), the IAEA addresses the
certification criteria (qualifications) for assessors and assessment laboratories and
certification criteria for evaluators and evaluation laboratories through its member states:
“The IAEA generally receives vulnerability assessments on safeguards
equipment systems via Member State experts who follow a general set of
assessment criteria prepared by the Agency.  These assessments would be
based on the [CC] and [CEM] in order to ensure comparable results.  As
many Member State experts move toward the use of third-party
laboratories, the IAEA will also have access to these resources.  Under the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA), these laboratories
are subject to strict quality standards ([EN45000] and [ISO17025]).  In
addition, the national oversight of these laboratories (and international
CCRA oversight) further assures technical competence.”
It would also be interesting to review the Common Criteria National Scheme for one or
more of the CCRA members to see how security evaluator qualifications and certification
is addressed.
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9.2 IAEA Oversight and Inspector Assurances
In ANNEX C [ITSECSES], the IAEA sets forth criteria that apply to the roles for IAEA
Oversight and Inspectors (including technicians).  The discussion is limited to the scope
these roles play in Vulnerability Assurance.
Among the criteria set forth for IAEA Oversight is to “Set standards for the technical
expertise, independence and working methods of assessors.” One could infer from this
that the IAEA will set criteria for assessors on a case-by-case basis, but this would put at
risk their goal of establishing an inventory of pre-assessed equipment that could be used
for new installations/systems.  Although not discussed in [ITSECSES] one presumes that
the IAEA plans to set requirements for assessors on a global (not product) basis and
provide for updates and waivers to those requirements.
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10 Other Issues
10.1 IAEA Procedures
In ANNEX D [ITSECSES], the IAEA provides a brief discussion of related internal
issues.  The IAEA requires integrating this proposed assurance scheme into their existing
procedures for authorizing safeguards equipment.
10.2 Integration of Security Requirements into Product Life Cycle
As IAEA security requirements extend into the operational life of equipment, this section
of ANNEX D provides a general discussion of standards for IT Life Cycle management
in an international setting.  [ITSECSES] notes that security requirements must be
integrated into the product and associated procedures throughout the life of the equipment
and software:
“To meet security functional requirements, these requirements must be
identified early, implemented during development, tested, and maintained
during use.
To meet security assessment requirements, assessment procedures (e.g.
the development of documentation, evidence) must be integrated
throughout the product definition, development, maintenance and
operation.”
Although the IAEA recognizes the need to address security functional requirements, in
[ITSECSES] only security assessment requirements are discussed in detail.
10.3 International Standards for Life Cycle Processes
International standards for life cycle processes are discussed.  It is noted that “…
[ISO15288] is expected to be adopted internationally as the basis for system life cycle
standardization.” [ISO15288] is a high-level standard that does not mandate particular
activities, but rather defines the processes required and provides a language that in
conjunction with other (more detailed and more specific) standards defines project life
cycles that implement these processes.  It seems appropriate for the IAEA in an
international setting to find [ISO15288] applicable.  The section goes on to discuss good
candidates for these more specific life cycle standards, in particular [ISO12207] and
[IEEE12207.1] and [IEEE12207.2].  There are three classes of life cycle processes
defined in [ISO12207], primary, supporting, and organizational processes.  These are
further broken down into five, eight, and four subclasses respectively.  It is worth noting
the names of the subclasses:
Primary Processes Acquisition
Supply
Development
Operation
Maintenance
Supporting Processes Documentation
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Configuration management
Quality assurance
Verification
Validation
Joint review
Audit
Problem resolution
Organizational Processes Management
Infrastructure
Improvement
Training
Table 2 – IEC/ISO 12207 Life Cycle Processes
It may be possible for the states of the FSU (especially RF) to adopt [ISO15288] and
[ISO12207], and to develop standards equivalent to the [IEEE12207] family.
Realistically this would almost certainly require support from an interested outside entity
(e.g., DTRA, or DOE).  This support would not only have to cover the technical aspects
of translation and submission through internal adoption mechanisms, but education of
staff in appropriate technical organizations.  Experience contracting for RF software
development projects under the MPC&A Program indicates there are existing but
generally outmoded standards for most if not all of the subclasses for Primary and
Organizational Processes defined in [ISO12207].  However, the same experience
indicates a severe shortfall in current RF standards concerning most if not all of the
defined subclasses for the Supporting Processes above.
As an example of the shortfall in standards and the associated education problem, the
quality assurance subclass above is potentially an important aspect of security assurance.
Indeed in ANNEX D [ITSECSES] it is discussed and there is mention of the Software
Engineering Institute’s integrated Capability Maturity Model [CMMI]. The IAEA is
already interested in EAL5 and one would anticipate eventual IAEA interest in EAL6 and
possibly EAL7.  EAL5 and EAL6 require semiformal methods and EAL7 requires formal
methods of system development. [CMMI] addresses both semiformal and formal
methods.  Again adoption in the RF of [CMMI] or any other semiformal and formal
methods standard would almost certainly require support including education from an
interested outside entity (e.g., DTRA, or DOE).
10.4 Safeguards Functionality for Remote Monitoring
The bulk of ANNEX E [ITSECSES] is concerned with aspects of remotely monitoring
safeguards equipment.  This requires a discussion of cryptography algorithms and
protocols, encryption key management, authentication of data collected during remote
monitoring, and transmission security among other issues.  This falls outside our current
scope of interest.
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11 Summary
The line of reasoning followed in [ITSECSES] is largely applicable to DTRA and DOE
authentication and assurance requirements for IT used to monitor and manage weapons
origin and weapons grade nuclear material.  There are enough differences in the
underlying missions and the relationship with the nuclear states being monitored that it is
not realistic for these agencies to adopt the IAEA approach as is.  However, significant
portions of the IAEA approach provide a good model for what is needed by DTRA and
DOE.  In the future, it seems possible that the IAEA, DTRA, and DOE might be able to
recognize and use one another’s evaluations of specialized safeguards equipment, in
much the same way that [CCRA] is intended to work.
However, agencies like DTRA and DOE need to evaluate the specific threats in their
respective mission environments and develop a set of specialized Authentication
Assurance Level (AAL) packages for those cases where they will require unique
protection profiles. On the basis of threat evaluation for a specific situation DTRA and
DOE should select pre-evaluated products and use existing protection profiles and
assurance level packages (from Common Criteria and possibly from the IAEA) where
these will satisfy the functional security requirements and assurance requirements.  On
occasion, DTRA and DOE will need to develop unique protection profiles for specialized
equipment and employ their AALs when evaluating these products.
For the RF to be able to step up to developing systems with functional security
requirements and security assurance requirements at AALs approximating EAL5 and
above, it will be necessary to support them in adopting standards equivalent to
[ISO15288], [ISO12207], and [CMMI].  An effort to educate (selected elements in) the
RF to use the associated tools and methods will almost certainly also be required.  This is
a natural progression from support they have received thus far toward the adoption of the
[CC] and [CCRA].  It may even prove difficult to consistently achieve an AAL
approximating EAL4 without these standards and education investments.
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12 Path Forward, DTRA Authentication with AALs
In developing a set of draft AALs with which to authenticate the Inventory Sampling
Measurement System and possibly other monitoring equipment at the Mayak FMSF,
PNNL has defined five Authentication Assurance levels, briefly described below:
AAL0 Unauthenticated
Equipment that has not received any assessment relative to
authentication.
AAL1 Minimally Authenticated
This AAL encapsulated the minimum level of assurance that any
equipment used in nuclear safeguards should have.  It encapsulates
the security processes and procedures generally employed in the
information technology industry to obtain a basic understanding of
the equipment's functionality and potential vulnerabilities.
AAL2 Limited Authentication
This AAL encapsulates the package of assurance measures that the
IT market expects of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment
protecting sensitive information.
AAL3 Critical Authentication
This AAL encapsulates the  level of assurance economically
realizable for equipment used in nuclear safeguards.  It encapsulates
the security processes and procedures shown to provide substantial
added assurance in the security features of equipment.  It is the
preferred assurance that any equipment used in nuclear safeguards
should have.
AAL4 Optimal Authentication
This AAL encapsulates the maximum level of assurance
economically possible for equipment used in nuclear safeguards.  It
encapsulates the security processes and procedures shown to
provide substantial added assurance in the security features of
systems.
AAL3 is considered as a reasonable target Authentication Assurance Level for
monitoring equipment, and is described in detail in [PNNL]. Because the Russian
Federation has yet to adopt the CC (though there is an active effort underway to do so)
PNNL has developed guidance material to assist the monitoring equipment developers to
meet the appropriate target AAL. A sample from the current working version of this
guidance is provided in the following tables.
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AAL1 AAL2 AAL3 AAL4
Configuration
Management (CM)
Consumer should
have a way to
identify that they
have the version
authenticated.
Consumer should have a way to
identify that they have the version
authenticated.
The developer should use a CM
system in the production of the
equipment
Consumer should have a way to
identify that they have the
version authenticated.
The developer should use a CM
system in the production of the
equipment
The CM system should include a
CM Plan describing how the CM
system in used.
The CM system should cover all
development materials.
The CM system should assure
that only authorized changes are
made
Consumer should have a way to
identify that they have the version
authenticated.
The developer should use an
automated CM system in the
production of the equipment
The CM system should include a CM
Plan describing how the CM system
in used.
The CM system should cover all
development materials and track
security flaws
The automated CM system should
assure that only authorized changes
are made
Delivery ProceduresUsers should
know how to
install the
equipment
Users should know how they will
receive the equipment
Users should know how to install
the equipment
Users should know how they
will receive the equipment
Users should know how to
install the equipment
Users should know how they will
receive the equipment
Users should be able to detect if the
equipment has been tampered with
during delivery
Users should know how to install the
equipment
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AAL1 AAL2 AAL3 AAL4
Development
Processes
User should have
an explanation of
how to interface
with the
equipment
User should have an explanation of
how to interface with the
equipment
Evaluators should understand the
basic architecture of the equipment.
User should have an explanation
of how to interface with the
equipment
Evaluators should understand the
basic how architecture of the
equipment, including the internal
interfaces between the
subsystems
User should have a comprehensive
explanation of how to interface with
the equipment
Evaluators should understand the
overall system security policies
implemented in the equipment
Evaluators should understand the
basic how architecture of the
equipment, including the internal
interfaces between the subsystems
Evaluators should understand the
design to the level of subsystem
modules.
Evaluators should inspect a sample
of the source code (or equivalent) to
determine that it reflects the design
Guidance
Documentation
Users and
administrators
need an
explanation of
security
information
relevant to them
Users and administrators need an
explanation of security information
relevant to them
Users and administrators need an
explanation of security
information relevant to them
Users and administrators need an
explanation of security information
relevant to them
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AAL1 EAL2 AAL3 AAL4
Life Cycle Support The developer  should take
measures to secure the
development facility
The developer  should take measures
to secure the development facility
The developer should follow a life
cycle model in the development of
the equipment
Any tools that the developer uses in
the development of the equipment
should be well defined and
understood.
Testing An independent
evaluator should
functionally test
based on the
interface
definition
The developer should functionally
test the equipment based on the
interface definition
The developer should conduct this
testing according to test plans and
procedures and document the
results of the testing.
An independent evaluator should
functionally test based on the
interface definition
An independent evaluator should
rerun a selection of the developer
tests.
The developer should
functionally test the equipment
based on the interface definition
The developer should conduct
this testing according to test
plans and procedures and
document the results of the
testing.
An independent evaluator should
functionally test based on the
interface definition
An independent evaluator should
rerun a selection of the
developer tests.
The developer should functionally
test the equipment based on the
interface definition
The developer should conduct this
testing according to test plans and
procedures and document the results
of the testing.
An independent evaluator should
functionally test based on the
interface definition
An independent evaluator should
rerun a selection of the developer
tests.
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AAL1 AAL2 AAL3 AAL4
Vulnerability
Assessment
Any probabilistic mechanism
should be strong enough to resist
direct attack
The evaluator should determine that
the equipment resists known
attacks
The user documentation should
be clear so the user and
administrator knows when the
equipment is in a secure
configuration.
Any probabilistic mechanism
should be strong enough to resist
direct attack
The evaluator should determine
that the equipment resists known
attacks
The user documentation should be
clear so the user and administrator
knows when the equipment is in a
secure configuration.
Any probabilistic mechanism should
be strong enough to resist direct
attack
The evaluator should determine that
th  equipment resists attacks by
personnel with some motivation and
resource.
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